Yury Drakakhrust
Recently many mass media have devoted their attention to the Belarus and the World: Geopolitical Choice through the prism of Economics and Politics research conducted by Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies (BISS) and Novak sociological laboratory.
Thanks to a nation-wide survey conducted in the first half of 2010, the researchers were able to obtain a number of very interesting and relevant conclusions, which broaden our knowledge about Belarusian society.
However, one of the most pivotal conclusions of the research is somewhat arguable. it is formulated in the following way: “The geopolitical choice is motivated by two factors: social mobility of the respondents (their ability to use the opportunities opened up by a shift in geopolitical orientation based on age and education) and, correspondently, their evaluation of economic pros and cons of a particular geopolitical scenario. The values factor of a geopolitical choice is almost entirely absent.”
This absence of values factor has gained considerable significance: it is being used by other researchers and experts as a solid fact. However, this conclusion, especially in its either-or version, is not so easily induced from the data provided by the researchers (at least it can have some alternative interpretation), and doesn’t correspond fully to other statistical and sociological data.
Show-pragmatism and bashful patriotism
One of the most important arguments is to a direct question: “What, in your opinion, should be the main factor in choosing Belarus’ allies?” Respondents have overwhelmingly chosen the following option: “To which extent that factor will improve the economic situation in the country”. This option was chosen by 55.1% of the respondents, the second most popular – “To which extent that factor will improve national security and stability” – 17.3%, while other options – even less than that.
Convincing? Not quite.
It is worth noting that this data corresponds to the research conducted by IISEPS, according to which the majority of Belarusians (often overwhelming) is choosing, year after year, from the two options – independence or welfare – . Here’s a strange thing, though: it appears that country’s independence is of also for the majority of those who are supposedly ready to sacrifice it for “for a piece of bread with butter”.
Of course, we can relate that to the contradictions of mass consciousness that doesn’t know what it wants. However, there can be a totally rational interpretation as well. The key to that is the thesis of researcher Yury Shautsov: “Belarusian patriotism is not shown, it shows up”.
Indeed, one can offer Belarus’ neighbors to choose between welfare and independence – Russians, Poles, or Lithuanians. The answer will most probably be unambiguously in favor of independence. However, not everyone truly thinks that way. It is simply comme il faut to answer that way in these societies. In Belarus, however, it is socially acceptable to answer in a different way; show-patriotism is a deviation from stereotypical reaction. The respondent thinks: “Am I a nationalist or something who shouts at every corner that independence is above all for him? Or am I a Russian or a Pole with their national pride? I am a normal Belarusian, just as everyone else, and I understand that wellbeing is the most important thing”. And so he answers in that way.
And this is not a deceit; it is merely dictated by the stereotype of mass consciousness.
The moment of truth-2004
A kind of a reality check of Belarusian “pragmatism” took place in February 2004. Several month before that IISEPS had conducted a survey on the choice between independence and welfare and the majority of respondents had chosen welfare. However, in February 204 the ironical history set an experiment under the disguise of conflict over gas prices with Russia, the essence of which was the above-mentioned dilemma: independence or welfare? What did Belarusians choose? Ok, the leader of all Belarusians Alexander Lukashenka made his choice because he had his political will and power. However, the rest of Belarusians made the same choice regardless of their rhetorical “pragmatism”. Bashful patriotism dictated the choice opposite to the show-pragmatism that had been demonstrated in the earlier survey. One thing is demonstrated, another thing shows up in reality.
Of course, the social pressure of this stereotype is a tendency: some people really think of independence or geopolitical choice in a deeply pragmatic manner. However, it is a very difficult task to differentiate between those who are sincere in their motivations and those simply subject themselves to a social stereotype, and that task, in my opinion, BISS researcher and Novak hadn’t managed to solve. To be more precise, they had only partly managed to do that.
In the research there were given many other arguments in support of the thesis that pro-European aspirations employ mainly pragmatic reasoning. Most probably the research was primarily focused on pro-European sentiments of Belarusians; the conclusion on pro-Russian sentiments was simply induced. There were many proofs to the statement that pro-European sentiments are largely pragmatic, including the answer to the question of motifs for choosing Belarus’ ally; the only proof of pro-Russian sentiments pragmatism was the answer to a direct question about the motifs. The researcher concluded that we have the same thing with pro-Russian choice as well.
Decile coefficient and the “golden” dozen
The reality is a bit different. Probably, the research was somewhat flawed not only by a certain lack of data but also by some presuppositions of the researchers and their stereotypes about modern Russia. The research showed that pro-European choice is made more often by “stronger” social groups that possess certain social resources: youth, big cities dwellers, and educated people. Based on that the researchers concluded: geopolitical choice is motivated by social mobility and evaluation of pros and cons of that choice. However, what are the economic pros and cons for weaker social groups – older people, the military, uneducated people – does the pro-Russian choice offer?
Let’s take for example, the income differences between 10% richest and 10% poorest people in a country, the so-called decile coefficient. According to the UN, in 2008 it was 6.9, in Germany – also 6.9, in Poland – 8.8, in Lithuania – 10.4, and in Russia – 12.7(!). In other words, according to this social inequality coefficient, Russia has more inequality not only than Belarus, but also than both old and new EU members. Some can say: well, Russia simply gives less to the lazy people; however, ideological mantras don’t change the essence: Russian socio-economic system gives “weaker” strata of society less than both Belarus and EU countries do.
Yes, Russia is richer than Belarus: for instance, in January 2010 the average pension in Russia was 220 US dollars, while average Belarusian pensioner got only 162 dollars. However, EU is both richer than Belarus and Russia: for example, in Poland (not the riches European country) the average pension in January was 487 dollars. If so, then why do “weaker” strata of Belarusian society make their geopolitical choice in favor of Russia, a country that is so bad specifically for their own welfare prospects, their personal economic pros and cons?
Maybe they don’t know what Russia is? I think they do know: many Belarusians have relatives in Russia, many people go there, and official Belarusian mass media have long been highly critical of Russia, the land (in their opinion) of social injustice, exploitation of common people, and predator capitalism. Moreover, it is “weaker” strata that tend to believe official mass media. And still they are choosing Russia. Why?
What’s for the opportunities opened up for the “stronger” strata by this or that geopolitical choice, the situation is not that simple either.
I have recently come across of a dozen most successful Russian businesspeople of Belarusian origin, three of whom are in top-100 of Russia’s richest businesspeople. It is worth noting that many of them are not Belarusians by blood who were born and raised in Russia; these are people who had been born in Belarus, moved later to Russia, and became tycoons there. However, I haven’t come across a list of Belarusians who have turned into multi-millionaires in the EU. Have you, dear reader? So which of the two geopolitical choices opens up more opportunities for dynamic and socially-mobile Belarusians?
“Be neither Eastern or Western, just be yourself”
Another indirect evidence for the argument that relation between rationality and geopolitical choice is a bit more difficult than presented in Belarus and the World: Geopolitical Choice through the prism Economics and Politics research is an exception provided by the researchers themselves. In one of the questions the respondents are offered to make a choice between four geopolitical options: a union with only EU, with only Russia, with both EU and Russia, and independent Belarus that is not a member of any unions. If Belarusians are really that pragmatic, if pro-Europeans view EU as a land of opportunity, if pro-Russians prefer social benefits, then who are those who choose independent Belarus distanced both from the East and from the West? Probably, pragmatic centrists: a bit of this, a bit of that. However, it is not true. According to the researchers, this group mainly consists of “Lukashenka’s supporters afraid of the “open sea” and, above all, Russia and who view Belarusian regime as their defender and benefactor”.
And what about social mobility and calculation of pros and cons as motives of a geopolitical choice? Why “weaker” social strata of Belarusian society prefer Russian “open sea”?
Things mentioned above are not an argument about what is better for Belarus: the East or the West. This is a criticism of the conclusion made by BISS and Novak researchers that that choice is merely dictated by economic pragmatism. It seems that they were misguided by false analogies.
“Russia is Belarus’ East”: our people and strangers
According to the research by IISEPS, Belarusians’ for geopolitical choice between Europe and Russia are in reality asymmetrical.
Pro-European sentiments are largely pragmatic by nature: supporters of European integration tend to think much more than others that life is better in the EU. The logic is quite simple: it is better there so if we are there too then we will live better. Pro-Russian sentiments have opposite motivations. Those in favor of integration with Russia tend to put the quality of life in Russia below that of Belarus not more but less (!) often than an average respondent. So where’s the pragmatic? It looks more like an anti-pragmatic: we want to move in the direction of a place that is even worse than our current place.
However, that becomes clear once we assume that pro-Russian sentiments are not pragmatic but value-based in nature. Some may consider these values to be bad, silly, or insincere; however, they will not stop being values and they will not become a mere calculation of gains and losses. The mechanism of that choice was brightly formulated by the philosopher Valyantsin Akudovich who said that Russia is not “to the east from Belarus”, it is rather “the East of Belarus”. To put it another way, that choice is motivated by proximity and closeness, feeling that Russians are our people. And Europeans are simply strangers, however prosperous they are.
It is somewhat not academic to include in the list of possible motivations for choosing Belarus’ allies the option “to choose those who are our people”. So that option was not given. It seems, however, that for a big part of Belarusians that option would have been the most adequate one.
It is a different question why the situation is the way it is. However, the true motivations of a geopolitical choice are not a purely academic issue. And it is better to have a relevant opinion, however unpleasant it may seem and however contradictory it is to someone’s beliefs.
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